A summary of the background on the issue is as follows: A plebiscite conducted in May, 1956, under UN supervision in British Togoland resulted in a 58% majority of the votes cast (approximately 170,000 voted out of an eligible list of about 194,000) for union with the Gold Coast (Ghana) when it obtains its independence (the date is set fori"Warch 6, 1957 ). The alternative offered in the plebiscite was separation of the Togoland Trust Territory from the Gold Coast -- it had been administered as an integral part. of that colony by the British -- and its continuation in trust status pending future developments leading to eventual freedom. As a result of the plebiscite and of subsequent general elections in the combined Gold Coast-Togoland area, which gave a clear majority over all other parties for the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), the advocates of a unitary state, the British government now urges an end to trusteeship and the integration of Briti sh Togoland into Ghana as soon as it becomes fully independent.
The great majority of tre speakers in the Fourth Committee have supported the British position, but it has been opposed by some representatives of both British and French Togoland groups, particularly as the result of recent developments in French Togoland: After plans were made for tr.e plebiscite in the British Trust Territory, the French government, which previously had not encouraged any nationalist political development, suddenly announced that the French Togolanders were ready to end trusteeship and detennine their future; a law was passed granting "universal suffrage, n and four months later the UN was asked to approve a Frehch•sponsored referendum to determine whether the Togo people wished to be "independent" under a new statute (giving the Togolanders territorial, administrative, and financial "autonomy" as to local matters, with 11 common 11 affairs determined by the French Parliament and the Assembly of the French Union, in which Togoland would be represented)., or to continue under trusteeship. Under the circumstances tre Trusteeship Council refused to supervise tl':e plebiscite; the French proceeded nevertheless to hold it in October of this year and announced that over three-quarters of tre voters had approved the end of trusteeship under the proposed new statute. Togolanders who oppose this future i'or the country claim that the voters' lists were 1!fixed11 and that force and fraud were used in tr.e election, which many of them boycotted as tre only feasible means of opposition. Partly as a result of these une,xpected events in French Togoland, African opposition to integration of British Togoland into Ghana on the part of the National Liberation movement in the Ashanti area of tre Gold Coast, the Nortrern Peoples Party, the Togoland Congress, and the All-Ewe Conference has emphasized the following arguments: (1) that it would separate the two parts of Togoland forever and leave French Togoland in an untenable position with no future but absorption by the French (although a united Togoland is claimed to be a real possibility in view of tre recent political dev~lopments in the French territory, tr~ common tribal traditions of the b'we people who live in both Togolands, and the potential viability of a united Togo state); (2) that integration into neighboring Ghana is an unfortunnte precedent which might be applied to the detriment of tra Cameroons, Ruanda-Uruncli, and other trust territories; and (3) that althoughh there was an overwhelming majority for union, large blocs of Togolanders voted by considerable margins against union, so that there was no real or sufficient consent. The French government exacerbated these fears by opposing simultaneous consideration of tre future of the two Togolands in the Fourth Committee and by refusing passports to French Togolanders who wished to argue for joint consideration until such time as the future of French Togoland was specifically before tre Fourth Committee. Opponents of integration have sought variously (a) continuation of trusteeship; (b) federation with Ghana (leaving open the possibility that French Togoland might also-federate at a later date); and (c) federation with a federated (rather than unitary) Ghana. Nevertheless, it appears likely that the great rnajority of the Fourth Connnittee will approve the proposed integration. Any division among the members of the Committee will be based not on any “cold war” consideration nor on any conventional bloc (India supports and Indonesia has quasi-integration), but rather on differing views of how best to solve the partly historical problems of this area.
The General Assembly approved the British request to end the British Togoland Trusteeship and to permit the integration of the Territory into the new state of Ghana, in accordance with the results of a referendum supervised by the UN. Despite some misgivings as to the effect of this action on the possibiJ.i ty of a future union of British and French Togoland Territories, which many petitioners from both areas desired, the Assembly vote favoring the British request was 63 too. Africa-UN Bulletein 6
British Cameroons: Plebiscite Postponed in South - 1958
At the 1958 session of the General Assembly no question aroused more bitterness than that of the future of the British and French Cameroons Trust Terri tories. These territories, halves of the pre-World War I German Kanerun colony, which first became League of Nations mandates and subsequently UN trust territories, in a cultural sense comprise three, rather than two, territories: the French terri to y, the Northern British Cameroons, and the Southern British Cameroons (the latter two separated by a thin slice of Nigerian territory). Determining their future last year, the Assembly acted as if three separate territories were involved and proposed different solutions for each. The 1958 Assembly voted to hold a plebiscite in the Northern Cameroonh this November in order to determine whether its inhabitants prefer to join an independent Nigeria (on October 1, 1960) or to defer a final decision on the territory's future until a later date. Surprisingly, the results of the plebiscite announced November 9 indicated that the people of the Northern Cameroons wished to have the trusteeship continue until a later time. Another plebiscite will be held after the French Cameroons and Nigeria have achieved independence, in 1960, to allow the people to choose whether they wish to join Nigeria, to join the French Cameroons, or to form an independent territory with the Southern British Cameroons. Following a bitter struggle which split the Afro-Asian bloc, the 1958 Assembly voted termination of trusteeship for the French Cameroons on January 1, 1960, when it is scheduled to receive full independence, without requiring prior elections, as demanded by the African countries. At that timeB Premier Ahijdo promised to hold elections immediately after independence; but at present he apparently needs French support to maintain order in the face of a minor rebellion presumably led by the banned UPC (Union des Populations Camerounaises). Therefore the liklihood of imme diate elections when the new state takes over its own internal security does not seem great. The uncertain state of affairs in the French Cameroons caused the difficulties the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee faced this year in implementing its resolution of the last session relating to the Southern Cameroons. Largely as the result of elec tions held last fall in the Southern Cameroons, which brought into power the party opposing unification with Nigeria and favoring reunification of British and French Cameroons, the 1958 Assembly adopted a resolution requiring a plebiscite to be held this winter to determine the future of the area. The exact wording of the plebiscite question was left to be determined by this session of the Assembly, the hope being that the two major political parties could agree upon a satisfactory formula in the intervening year. However, at the beginning of this Assembly session the government leader, John Foncha, had not been able to reach any agreement with the opposition leader, E. M. L. Endeley, who favors union with Nigeria. Since Foncha's party had become frightened by the prospect of union with the French Cameroons in its current troubled state, page 2 Foncha felt obliged to ask the Fourth Committee to continue trusteeship over the Southern Cameroons until 1962, when he proposed that the plebiscite should be held. Endeley, sensing that current events were strengthening his party's position, sup ported an immediate vote. Eventually, under pressure from the Independent African States' Organization, the two leaders agreed on a plebiscite to be held between September 30, 1960, and March, 1961, in which the choice would be between achieving independence by joining an independent Nigeria or an independent Republic of the (Frenco Cameroons. Surprisingly, many delegates objected strongly to the temporary continuation of trusteeship over the Southern Cameroons, even with the consent of the major parties there. The objections of the outspoken Indian delegation were based on the doubtful legality of the resulting alteration of the British Cameroons trusteeship agreement (although the UN legal counsel did not have such doubts) and on the "bad precedent as to partition" (of the entire British Cameroons territory) which might be establsihed thereby. It seems possible that the Indians were still smarting from the rebuff handed the UN's 195 Visiting Mission to the Cameroons, which included an Indian delegate; its recommendation to unite the Northern Cameroons to Nigeria without a plebiscite was overruled, and its acceptance of the Ahijdo government of the French Cameroons as.fully representative was sharply challenged by all the African states, who demanded UN-supervised general elections prior to independence and the end of trusteeship. (It is clear that the Africans will again raise the question of elec tions in the French Cameroons if they have an opportunity.) Ultimately the Fourth Committee adopted the compromise worked out by Foncha and Edeley, including a provision that eligible voters should be limited to persons born in the Southern Cameroons or one of whose parents was born there. (This will bar many Nigerians and French Cameroonians whose interests do not necessarily coincide with those of the South Camerooians.) The General Assembly approved the draft reso lution on October 16.
South African Plebiscite Proposal for South West Africa - 1971
